The Top Ten Threats
Previous Ranking: 5
Percentage Detected: 4.26%
HTML/Iframe.B is generic detection of malicious IFRAME tags embedded in HTML pages, which redirect the browser to a specific URL location with malicious software.
Previous Ranking: 1
Percentage Detected: 3.45%
Previous Ranking: 2
Percentage Detected: 2.59%
Generic detection of HTML web pages containing script obfuscated or iframe tags that that automatically redirect to the malware download.
Previous Ranking: 4
Percentage Detected: 2.08%
Sality is a polymorphic file infector. When run starts a service and create/delete registry keys related with security activities in the system and to ensure the start of malicious process each reboot of operating system.
It modifies EXE and SCR files and disables services and process related to security solutions.
More information relating to a specific signature:
Previous Ranking: 3
Percentage Detected: 2.06%
This detection label is used to describe a variety of malware using the file autorun.inf as a way of compromising a PC. This file contains information on programs meant to run automatically when removable media (often USB flash drives and similar devices) are accessed by a Windows PC user. ESET security software heuristically identifies malware that installs or modifies autorun.inf files as INF/Autorun unless it is identified as a member of a specific malware family.
Removable devices are useful and very popular: of course, malware authors are well aware of this, as INF/Autorun’s frequent return to the number one spot clearly indicates. Here’s why it’s a problem.
The default Autorun setting in Windows will automatically run a program listed in the autorun.inf file when you access many kinds of removable media. There are many types of malware that copy themselves to removable storage devices: while this isn’t always the program’s primary distribution mechanism, malware authors are always ready to build in a little extra “value” by including an additional infection technique.
While using this mechanism can make it easy to spot for a scanner that uses this heuristic, it’s better to disable the Autorun function by default, rather than to rely on antivirus to detect it in every case.
Previous Ranking: 7
Percentage Detected: 1.62%
The Win32/Conficker threat is a network worm originally propagated by exploiting a recent vulnerability in the Windows operating system. This vulnerability is present in the RPC sub-system and can be remotely exploited by an attacker without valid user credentials. Depending on the variant, it may also spread via unsecured shared folders and by removable media, making use of the Autorun facility enabled at present by default in Windows (though not in Windows 7).
Win32/Conficker loads a DLL through the svchost process. This threat contacts web servers with pre-computed domain names to download additional malicious components. Fuller descriptions of Conficker variants are available at http://www.eset.eu/buxus/generate_page.php?page_id=279&lng=en.
While ESET has effective detection for Conficker, it’s important for end users to ensure that their systems are updated with the Microsoft patch, which has been available since the third quarter of 2008, so as to avoid other threats using the same vulnerability. Information on the vulnerability itself is available at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/ms08-067.mspx. While later variants dropped the code for infecting via Autorun, it can’t hurt to disable it: this will reduce the impact of the many threats we detect as INF/Autorun. The Research team in San Diego has blogged extensively on Conficker issues: http://www.eset.com/threat-center/blog/?cat=145
It’s important to note that it’s possible to avoid most Conficker infection risks generically, by practicing “safe hex”: keep up-to-date with system patches, disable Autorun, and don’t use unsecured shared folders.
Previous Ranking: 7
Percentage Detected: 1.52%
Win32/Dorkbot.A is a worm that spreads via removable media. The worm contains a backdoor. It can be controlled remotely. The file is run-time compressed using UPX.
The worm collects login user names and passwords when the user browses certain web sites. Then, it attempts to send gathered information to a remote machine. This kind of worm can be controlled remotely.
Previous Ranking: 9
Percentage Detected: 1.35%
It is a file infector. It’s a virus that executes on every system start.It infects dll and exe files and also searches htm and html files to write malicious instruction in them. It exploits vulnerability on the system (CVE-2010-2568) that allows it to execute arbitrary code. It can be controlled remotley to capture screenshots, send gathered information, download files from a remote computer and/or the Internet, run executable files or shut down/restart the computer.
Previous Ranking: 10
Percentage Detected: 1.15 %
This threat copies itself to the %system32% folder of Windows before starting. It then communicates over DNS with its command and control server. Win32/Qhost can spread through e-mail and gives control of an infected computer to an attacker.
Previous Ranking: n/a
Percentage Detected: 0.95%
Win32/Virut is a polymorphic file infector. It affects files with EXE and SCR extensions, by adding the threat itself to the last section of the files source code. Aditionally, it searches for htm, php and asp files adding to them a malicious iframe. The virus connects to the IRC network. It can be controlled remotely.
PC Support Scams: still keeping us amused
David Harley CITP FBCS CISSP ESET Senior Research Fellow
A version of this article previously appeared on the Chainmailcheck hoax/scam blog.
It’s been a while since I picked up the phone and found myself talking to a support scammer. That may be in part because I’m less likely to pick up a call that is flagged as ‘International’, ‘Withheld’ or ‘Unknown number’. But when I do pick up a suspiciously anonymous call, it’s usually a different kind of scam, PPI reclaim voice spam (mostly automated), and so on.
I haven’t missed it a bit. So when I got a phone call from someone with a hard-to-parse Asiatic accent came on the line and started a familiar spiel, it was never likely that I was going to play along for any length of time. Life is too short.
The spiel, by the way, opens something like this, in my experience. Your mileage may vary.
“Am I speaking [or ‘Can I speak to’] to Mr Jones?”
In this case, as in most of the support scams I get, the fact that I wasn’t the person the scammer was expecting made no difference at all, though he did apologize profusely for getting my name wrong. Sometimes, though, the scammer will go to some length to tell you who you are and where you live, no doubt so that you will believe them when they tell you that they know that your PC is having problems (or causing them for someone else). However, if they manage to get your details right, that only really means that they’ve managed to check them in a directory.
Actually, the name they usually use when they call me isn’t Jones, and I sometimes get calls that appear to be legitimate asking for the same person, so I guess there is a wrong entry on a directory or customer lead list somewhere. My rule of thumb is that if the caller apologizes for bothering me and rings off, it’s probably a legitimate call that neither of us have any interest in. Though if the intended call was a sales call, that might raise a question as to whether they’d checked that the number was registered with the UK’s Telephone Preference Service, a “do not call” list. Still, if they thought they were dealing with a customer, it’s a grey area, at worst.
On this latest occasion, though, the scammer didn’t go into the ‘you are leaking viruses onto the entire Internet’ spiel: instead, having ascertained that I actually had a computer, he started to tell me about computer errors and how they were worse than viruses because anti-virus software doesn’t detect them. As he didn’t seem deterred by my bursting into laughter, I told him that I’m a security researcher specializing in exposing support scams. As he didn’t seem to know what a support scam is, I started to explain it to him, but he rang off. So I don’t know exactly where he was going: no doubt he was going to ‘prove’ to me – perhaps with Event Viewer or ASSOC – that my system was at risk. But while I’m always interested in the latest scammer ploys, sometimes you just don’t want to waste a Friday evening scammer baiting. Still, it seems that this is not an unusual approach: this, for instance, was a recent comment to one of my earlier blogs:
“…Said they were getting errors from my machine and my harddrive was corrupted. He prompted me to look at the event viewer, where I scrolled down and came to the first error which I tried to relate to him but he said that is all he needs and the error proves that my machine is infected. I have a good virus program and a good malware program I told him, but he said that the malware was undetectable.”
Other recent comments showed that some people are still getting a certain amount of amusement out of yanking the chains of these wretched people. One of them interrupted their spiel by coming over all Anonymous:
We are Anonymous
We are one we are Many
We do not forgive
We do not forget
It amused me, too. I can’t guarantee that this will work in all cases, though.
Another told us:
“I did a quick search on Google for CLSID and found many examples of what a CLSID should look like. I quoted one of them to her and she freaked out because obviously I’m infected. So, I pretended to freak out too. I started screaming for my husband and quoting scripture. Having a blast by now. I kept yelling ‘save me Jesus!’ over and over. Then I begged her to please, please help me. What in the world am I to do? Poor helpless me!”
And finished off by telling the scammer in no uncertain terms what to expect if their paths crossed. Scary.
If you’re not familiar with this class of cold-call scam, here’s a paper a quartet of us (Martijn Grooten of Virus Bulletin, Steve Burn of Malwarebytes, my former colleague Craig Johnston and myself) presented at Virus Bulletin last year. It’s pretty comprehensive: My PC has 32,539 errors: how telephone support scams really work.
Other papers and blogs written or part-written by ESET researchers:
- FUD and Blunder: Tracking PC Support Scams
- Hanging on the Telephone
- How to recognize a PC support scam
- Misusing VERIFY (and other support scam tricks)
- Online PC Support scam: from cold calling to malware
- FTC cracks down on tech support scams and feds nail fake AV perps
Education as Data Defense
Stephen Cobb, CISSP
Senior Security Researcher, ESET North America
One possible consequence of an information security failure is the compromise of personal information known as a data breach. Each year, the Ponemon Institute tracks the total cost of data breaches based on a broad sample of companies, then calculates the average cost per capita (or person exposed). The latest figure: $136 per record. That’s a global average, up from $130 in the previous year’s study (based on incidents at 277 companies in 9 countries, the May 2013 report was sponsored by Symantec).
Clearly, digital information systems that handle confidential personal data are crucial to much of what we do today, either as consumers or business people, and failure to protect those systems can have costly consequences. (Bear in mind that the Ponemon research found organizations in Germany and the U.S. experienced significantly higher costs, $199 and $188 respectively). Nevertheless, many people still seem to think we can keep these systems secure, always available, and always accurate, without providing the people who use them with relevant security training. That’s like thinking we can have a safe and reliable transportation system without well-trained mechanics and properly licensed vehicle operators.
Last year, ESET conducted two surveys in America to better understand this phenomenon of cybersecurity under-education. We asked employed Americans if they had ever received computer security training of any kind from their employer. Only 32% said they had. In a second study, we asked a different group of Americans if they had ever taken any classes or training related to protecting their computer and/or personal information. For 68% of respondents, the answer was never. In other words, we can assume that less than a third of the workforce has any cyber security training at all.
This is a serious problem and Verizon’s 2013 Data Breach Investigation Report speaks to this problem: The difficulty level of unauthorized intrusions into systems was rated as “low” in 78% of cases. Of course, the reality of a workforce under-educated in the realm of data defense is not news to criminals and other bad actors intent on abusing information technology for their own ends. They already know that employees are often the weakest link in an organization’s information security.
As long as high tech security measures can be beaten by low tech attacks that exploit human weaknesses—such as inadequate knowledge and understanding—our data and systems will remain at risk of serious compromise. If your organization needs to be persuaded to spend money on security awareness and training try sharing this calculation: 7,500 customer records exposed at a cost of $136 per record = more than $1 million.
When you consider that equation, spending money on information security training and awareness makes a lot of sense, on the organizational level and within society as a whole. After all, data breaches are not a rare occurrence these days. One reason for this is the underground market in stolen data that is now thriving. Yet some organizations still don’t realize that the personally identifiable information stored in their systems, be it customer records or employee records or data managed for a third party, is a target for cyber criminals.
Right now, the burden for security training falls mainly on companies, with some help from organizations like Security Our eCity and Ciber Seguridad. However, in the future your organization could be spared some of these costs if your country was committed to teaching cybersecurity hygiene to everyone, from an early age. We have not yet seen that kind of commitment in America, but that does not mean it is not possible. For example, in Estonia they have made cybersecurity training part of elementary-level school curriculum and they are working on expanding the program into preschool. Clearly, the time to invest in computer security training for employees is now, both at work and in our schools.