
ESET researchers have discovered Deadglyph, a sophisticated backdoor used by the Stealth Falcon group for espionage in the Middle East.
For years, the Middle East has maintained its reputation as a fertile ground for advanced persistent threats (APTs). In the midst of routine monitoring of suspicious activities on the systems of high-profile customers, some based in this region, ESET Research stumbled upon a very sophisticated and unknown backdoor that we have named Deadglyph. We derived the name from artifacts found in the backdoor (such as 0xDEADB001, shown also in Table 1), coupled with the presence of a homoglyph attack. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first public analysis of this previously undocumented backdoor, used by a group that exhibits a notable degree of sophistication and expertise. Based on the targeting and additional evidence, we attribute Deadglyph with high confidence to the Stealth Falcon APT group.
Deadglyph’s architecture is unusual as it consists of cooperating components – one a native x64 binary, the other a .NET assembly. This combination is unusual because malware typically uses only one programming language for its components. This difference might indicate separate development of those two components while also taking advantage of unique features of the distinct programming languages they utilize. Different language can also be harnessed to hinder analysis, because mixed code is more difficult to navigate and debug.
The traditional backdoor commands are not implemented in the backdoor binary; instead, they are dynamically received by it from the command and control (C&C) server in the form of additional modules. This backdoor also features a number of capabilities to avoid being detected.
Take a look at the blogpost on We Live Security, where we take a closer look at Deadglyph and provide a technical analysis of this backdoor, its purpose, and some of the additional components we obtained. We are also presenting our findings about Deadglyph at the LABScon 2023 conference.
